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Abstract
Prior research has established that high operating leverage leads to high
systematic risk. We examine a rms choice of operating leverage in a principal-
agent setting, and nd that the degree of operating leverage is strictly lower
when the managers actions are unobservable. Further, the production output
is also lower when agency problems are present. The suboptimal operational
decisions result in not only decreased shareholder value, but also lower con-
sumer surplus and lower total social welfare. However, accounting information
can help mitigate this problem. Specically, the more precise the accounting
information, the less the reduction in the players payo¤s. With the recent
trend in risk management moving toward a more comprehensive approach in
evaluating a rms risk, the results of this paper can provide some insight on
how risk a¤ects a rms stakeholders di¤erently, and what consequences it has
in a broader economic sense.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358670 
I. Introduction
It has long been known that operating leverage contributes to a rms risk.
The higher the rms xed cost is in relation to its variable cost, the more sensitive
the rms prot to uncertain market demand. Prior theoretical research (Rubinstein
1973; Lev 1974; Carlson et al. 2004; Cooper 2006; etc.) demonstrates that operating
leverage leads to higher systematic risk for the rm, and recent empirical research
(Gulen et al. 2008; Garcia-Feijoo and Jorgensen 2010; Novy-Marx 2011) conrms
the relation by showing a value premium related to operating leverage. While these
prior studies typically assume a rms operating leverage as exogenous and focus on
its e¤ect on the rms market value, we endogenize the choice of operating leverage in
a principal-agent setting and examine its e¤ect on a broader set of economic agents,
including the rms shareholders, managers, and consumers.
Recent trends in risk management call for a holistic approach when viewing
a rms risk prole (Beasley et al. 2005; Gordon et al. 2009). Risk may a¤ect
di¤erent stakeholders of a rm di¤erently, depending on their incentives and risk-
bearing abilities. The optimal risk-sharing among di¤erent stakeholders is thus a key
to managing a rms risk and incentive structure. In this paper, we intend to examine
how the presence of agency problems a¤ect managerial incentives and operational
decisions, such as choosing operating leverage and production output for the rm.
Specically, we consider a one-period game in an economy with a monopolist
rm and a representative consumer. The rm makes a product and sells it to the
consumer. The rms source of external risk comes from uncertain market demand.
The rms owner delegates the business decisions to a risk-averse manager, who is
responsible for the rms operations, including choosing the rms operating leverage
and deciding the rms production quantity. The production technology available to
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the rm results in a Cobb-Douglas production function. This technology features
substitution between the two production inputs, an initial xed capital investment in
equipment and facility, and subsequent variable manufacturing costs such as material
and labor. A higher xed capital cost will result in a more e¢ cient production process,
hence lower subsequent variable costs. However, once the capital intensity is chosen
and installed, the operating leverage of the rm becomes xed and cannot be further
altered.1
We examine how the presence of agency problems a¤ects a rms operating lever-
age and production quantity decisions. We nd, when the managers actions are unob-
servable or uncontractible, the degree of operating leverage and production quantity
chosen by the rm are both strictly lower than under the rst best scenario. This
result occurs because the rms operating leverage a¤ects both the mean and variance
of the future rm prot. Since higher operating leverage leads to higher volatility of
the rms prot, it also implies a higher risk premium for which the manager must be
compensated. Therefore, the operating leverage chosen by the manager must balance
the decrease in the expected future rm prot and the increase in the managers risk
premium.
Similarly, a high production output also leads to decreased rm prot and an
increased risk premium simultaneously. As a result, the rm is better o¤ choosing a
production quantity that is lower than when the agency problem is absent. Expect-
edly, this departure from operational optimality leads to decreased shareholder value.
In addition, a lower production output also reduces the consumer surplus. In fact,
we show that both the consumer surplus and total social welfare are lower as a result
1The production technology thus exhibits a "putty-clay" feature (Johansen, 1959). That is,
although the ex-ante capital inputs and other inputs are substitutable, the techonology is no longer
mallaeble once the capital inputs are installed. This ex-ante exible and ex-post inexible feature
of the technology means the capital intensity can be chosen only once.
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of the rms agency problem.
We also nd that accounting information of high quality could help reduce the
ine¢ ciencies brought upon by the rms agency problem. A sound accounting sys-
tem that generates accounting signals with high precision provides the rm with a
more accurate estimate of the uncertain information, and hence reduces the rms
systematic risk. As a result, the accounting information lessens the decrease in the
operating leverage and the production quantity, and the reduction in the consumer
surplus and the total social welfare.
This paper makes three contributions to the extant literature. First, it is the rst
to examine the impact of agency problems on a rms choice of operating leverage
and subsequent production output. We show the agency problems lead to ine¢ cient
operational decisions, and these decisions further a¤ect the payo¤s of the players in
the game. Our model di¤ers from the majority of prior studies on agency problems
in that we explicitly model the managers operational decisions, instead of assuming
the managers e¤ort a¤ects the rms prot directly. Our model also di¤ers from
prior studies on operating leverage, that typically assumes the operating leverage of
a rm is exogenous. We model the operating leverage as a choice variable and derive
it endogenously.
Second, this paper evaluates the impact of operating leverage in a broader sense
than most of the prior studies. Instead of focusing on its e¤ect on shareholder value
only, we examine how it a¤ects the optimal risk allocation between the shareholder
and the manager, as well as the welfare of the consumer. As risk management prac-
tice moves toward a more comprehensive approach, understanding a rms full risk
prole is essential. In addition, the results of this model also provide some regulatory
implications, by showing that total social welfare can be a function of the rms risk
management and agency issues.
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Third, we show the importance of accounting information in mitigating the risk
faced by a rm and the associated consequences. Specically, an accounting system
with good quality can signicantly reduce the suboptimal operational decisions and
the ine¢ ciencies these decisions bring to the rm. As a result, accounting information
can improve not just the rms own protability, but also the welfare of consumers
and the whole economy.
This paper relates to but di¤ers from prior studies on operating leverage. Ru-
binstein (1973) and Lev (1974) use a CAPM model to show how operating leverage
increases the systematic risk of the rm and thus a¤ects the rms expected return.
Goldenberg and Chiang (1983) show, however, the relation between a rms oper-
ating leverage and the market beta becomes ambiguous when variabilities in both
the output and the input markets are incorporated. Several recent theoretical pa-
pers also examine the e¤ect of operating leverage on rms risk and return. Carlson
et al. (2004) demonstrate the relation between corporate investment decisions and
stock returns through the operating leverage e¤ect. Zhang (2005) examines a setting
where the rm operates in an competitive product market and bears high adjust-
ment cost to technological change. Aguerrevere (2009) considers the strategic role of
the competing rmsinvestment decisions and nds that competition increases the
rmsrisk. Cooper (2006) analyzes the asymmetric change in market value during
economic up- and downturns, and show rms with high book-to-market stocks have
greater systematic risk. None of these papers involve agency problems.
This paper also relates to the vast literature on principal agent models involving
hidden actions, especially in the LEN setting (linear contract, exponential utility,
and normally distributed output). Many prior studies have explored applications
of this model in di¤erent variations, including with single action, multiple actions,
multiple performance measures, and multiple periods (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987;
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Feltham and Xie 1994; Hemmer 1996; Datar et al. 2000; etc.) However, these studies
typically assume the agents e¤ort directly improves the nal output, and the model
in our paper instead involves the agents decisions a¤ecting the rms prot through
interim operational decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 analyzes the rst best scenario when all the managers actions are observable
or contractible. Section 4 analyzes the scenario when these actions are unobservable.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. The Model
We consider a monopolist rm, owned by a risk-neutral investor, making and
selling a product to the consumer. The market demand for the product is uncertain,
with an inverse demand function P = a   Q + e.2 The demand uncertainty,  
N (0; 2) ; is only realized at the end of the period. However, at the beginning of
the game, the rms accounting system generates a noisy signal about the market
demand, which is mandatorily disclosed to the public. The signal is es = a+e+e", with
e"  N (0; 2") : The precision of the signal es, 12" ; represents the quality of accounting
information. A higher precision indicates an accounting system of higher quality.
Since es is an imperfect but unbiased signal of the demand uncertainty e, es is also
normally distributed, with es  N (0; 2 + 2"). After receiving the accounting signal,
the players in the game apply the Bayes rule and update their belief about e toejes = s  N  2"s
2+
2
"
;
2
2
"
2+
2
"

.3
2We assume the demand intercept a is su¢ ciently large to guarantee a meaningful solution to the
following problem. Specically, we require a > 2 to guarantee positive production quantities and
rm prot levels.
3Note that at time 2, when an accounting signal s is generated and disclosed, the expected value
of demand uncertainty is E
hejes = si = 2"s
2+
2
"
. However, at time 1, before the accounting signal is
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Instead of managing the rm herself, the investor hires a manager to oversee
the business on her behalf. The manager is responsible for two operational decisions:
selecting an appropriate production technology and deciding the production quan-
tity for the rm. The production process requires two inputs, K and L, where K
represents capital costs such as investments in the equipment and facilities, and L
represents non-capital inputs such as direct material and labor. We assume a technol-
ogy that requires a higher initial capital investment needs lower material and labor
inputs in the subsequent production process.4 To capture the technical substitution
between K and L, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function
(1) Q = K
1
2L
1
2 :
The total production cost is therefore KwK + LwL, with the production input
factor prices denoted as wK and wL. Without loss of generality, we scale the input
factor prices to one dollar per unit. That is, wK = wL = 1:
The manager chooses the technology by choosing K, the degree of "capital inten-
sity." Once the capital inputs are purchased and installed, K = K; the technology
can no longer be changed. Essentially, each ex-ante level of K corresponds to an
ex-post xed degree of operating leverage, as we know from the production function
that the non-capital input is L = Q
2
K . The rms total xed cost is therefore F = K
,
and total variable cost is V = Q
2
K . The rms unit variable cost is v =
Q
K .
The rm owner pays the manager an amount W per his employment contract.
The contract takes a linear form W =  + , where  is the rms prot,  is the
actually disclosed, the expected value of demand uncertainty is E
h
E
hejesii = E hei = 0. In either
case, the variance of the conditional demand uncertainty is V AR
hejesi = 22"
2+
2
"
:
4This setup is similar to that of Lev (1974). Lev (1974) shows that variable cost is likely to
decrease when xed cost F increases, thus the operating leverage of the rm and the resulting prot
variance both increase.
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managers xed salary, and  is his bonus coe¢ cient. The manager is risk averse,
with a negative exponential utility function  e 

W  I2
2

, where  is his degree of
risk-aversion. The manager can still make a personal investment to improve the rm
prot : This investment is denoted as I, and is unveriable and uncontractible. The
personal cost of this investment to the manager is I
2
2
. The rms prot is thus
(2)  =

Q(a Q+ e) K   Q2
K
+ Ijes :
Since the conditional demand uncertainty
ejes is normally distributed and Q is a
non-random variable, we know  is also normally distributed with mean equalling
Q(a Q) K   Q2
K
+ I; and variance equalling Q2 
2

2
"
2+
2
"
:
All information, except the managers personal investment I, is common knowl-
edge for everybody in the economy. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure
1.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Contracts Accounting Manager Manager Manager Prot realized
signed by signal s chooses decides makes and manager
owner and generated. capital quantity Q. investment I. compensated.
manager. intensity K.
Figure 1: Timeline of events.
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III. Contractible actions
As a benchmark, we rst examine the rst best solution to the rm owners
problem. Under the rst-best scenario, the managers capital intensity choice K,
production quantity Q, and personal investment I are all observable and contractible.
The rm owners problem is thus
max
I;Q;K
E [ W jes](3)
=   + (1  )

Q

a Q+ E
h
E
hejesii K   Q2
K
+ I

:(4)
Under the rst-best scenario, the rm owner can fully insure the managers risk by
setting  = 0; and reimburse the manager for his personal investment by setting
 = I
2
2
. The rm owners objective function can be rewritten as
(5) max
I;Q;K
Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I   I
2
2
:
Proposition 1. Under the rst best scenario, the rms optimal choice of capital
intensity is KFB = (a 2)
2
, and the production quantity is QFB = (a 2)
2
. The managers
personal investment level is IFB = 1:
Proof. See appendix.
The results presented in Proposition 1 set the socially optimal benchmark for the
rms level of capital intensity, production quantity and the managers personal e¤ort.
Note that under the rst best scenario, the risk-neutral rm owner maximizes her
expected payo¤, and the variance of the rm prot does not enter into her objective
function. The precision of the accounting information thus does not play a role here.
We then examine the payo¤s to the three economic agents. The managers pay,
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W = 1
2
; is simply the reimbursement of his personal investment. The rm owners
payo¤ is the rms gross prot  net of the managers pay. We also evaluate the
payo¤ to the representative consumer. The results are summarized in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Under the rst best scenario, the rms expected net prot is  W =
1
4
(a2   4a+ 6), the consumer surplus is V = 1
8
(a  2)2, and the total social welfare
is  W + V = 1
8
(3a2   12a+ 16) :
Proof. See appendix.
We see from Corollary 2 that the rm owners payo¤ and the consumer surplus
are both increasing functions of the demand intercept a. That is, the higher the
market demand, the higher the payo¤s to all. Note that the condition a > 2 must
hold for the solutions in Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 to hold because the rms
selling price must be higher than the average cost of the product.
Figure 1 shows the rms net prot, the consumer surplus and the total social
welfare under the rst best scenario.
0 5 10 15 20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
demand
profit/surplus
 total social welfare; - - - net rm prot;    consumer surplus
Figure 1: Welfare under the rst best scenario.
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IV. Uncontractible actions
When the managers actions are unobservable or uncontractible, the rm owner
can only use the contract terms  and  to maximize her objective function. The
manager will choose I, Q, and K to maximize his own utility. Conditional on the
accounting signal es, the managers utility is
(6)  e 

+

Q(a Q+e) K Q2
K
+I

  I2
2
jes
;
with a certainty equivalent of
(7)  + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2
;
with 
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2+
2
"
representing his risk premium. The rm owners problem becomes:
max
;
E [ W jes]
= E

  + (1  )

Q(a Q+ e) K   Q2
K
+ I

jes(8)
s:t:
0   + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2
(9)
I 2 arg max
I

 + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2

(10)
Q 2 arg max
Q

 + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2

(11)
K 2 arg max
K

 + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2

(12)
The owner maximizes the expected rm prot net of the managers pay, subject
to the usual participation constraint, and three incentive compatibility constraints
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regarding the managers personal investment, the rms production quantity and the
capital intensity.
Proposition 3. Under the second best scenario, given the optimal contract terms 
and ,5 the rms optimal choice of capital intensity is K = a 2
2+
2

2"
2

+2"
, and the
production quantity is Q = a 2
2+
2

2"
2

+2"
. The managers personal investment level is
I = .
Proof. See appendix.
To demonstrate the relationship among the key variables, we assign numerical
values to the parameters to construct an example. We set the demand intercept a to
equal 10, and we further assume the noise term  has a standard normal distribution
(2 = 1). We then let the managers degree of risk aversion, , and the variance of
the noise term of the accounting signal, 2"; vary between 0 and 1. A higher value of
 would imply that the manager is more risk averse, and a higher value of 2" would
imply a less precise accounting signal.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the managers optimal bonus coe¢ cient as a function
5To avoid lengthy notations in the proposition, please see the appendix for the solved values of
 and .
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of the accounting precision 1
2"
, and the managers risk aversion , respectively.
2 4 6 8 10
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.90
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
accounting precision
bonus coefficient
Numerical values: a = 10;  = 0:5; 2 = 1
Figure 2: Bonus coe¢ cient  as a function of accounting precision 1
2"
:
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
risk aversion
bonus coefficient
Numerical values: a = 10; 2" = 0:5; 
2
 = 1
Figure 3: Bonus coe¢ cient  as a function of risk aversion :
Figures 2 and 3 show that a higher accounting precision leads to a higher bonus
coe¢ cient, and a higher degree of risk aversion by the manager leads to a lower
bonus coe¢ cient. The intuition behind the numerical examples is the same as in a
conventional moral hazard model, in that the bonus coe¢ cient decreases in both the
external uncertainty and the agents risk aversion.
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Corollary 4. Under the second best scenario, the rms production quantity Q and
choice of capital intensity K both increase in the precision of the rms accounting
signal 1
2"
, but are both strictly lower than under the rst best scenario.
Proof. See appendix.
Compared to the results in Proposition 1, the production quantity and capital
intensity are both lower under the second best scenario than under the rst best.
However, this decrease can be lessened by the precision of the accounting informa-
tion. In fact, if the accounting signal becomes innitely precise (2" ! 0), then the
production quantity and capital intensity chosen will approach the rst best level.
Figure 4 demonstrates the values of production quantity and capital intensity of the
rm as functions of the accounting precision under both the rst best and the second
best scenarios.
0 2 4 6 8 10
3.7
3.8
3.9
4.0
accounting precision
quantity/capital intensity
Numerical values: a = 10;  = 0:5; 2 = 1
 rst best; - - - second best
Figure 4: Production quantity Q (capital intensity K) as
a function of accounting precision
1
2"
.
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Corollary 5. Under the second best scenario, the rms net prot   W , the con-
sumer surplus V , and the total social welfare  W + V , are all strictly lower than
that under the rst best scenario.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 5 shows that the payo¤to the rm owner is lower under the second best
scenario than under the rst best. Further, it shows that the consumer surplus is also
lower. This result occurs because the manager chooses a production quantity that is
strictly lower when his actions are unobservable or uncontractible, and less demand
from the consumer is met as a consequence. Obviously, the total social welfare under
the second best is also lower.
Figures 5 demonstrates the di¤erence between the rm owners payo¤s   W
under the rst best and the second best scenarios through numerically. Figure 6
shows the di¤erence in the consumer surplus V:
2 4 6 8 10
15.4
15.6
15.8
16.0
16.2
16.4
16.6
accounting precision
net firm profit
Numerical values: a = 10;  = 0:5; 2 = 1
 rst best; - - - second best
Figure 5: Net rm prot  W as a function of accounting precision 1
2"
:
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2 4 6 8 10
6.6
6.8
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
8.0
accounting precision
consumer surplus
Numerical values: a = 10;  = 0:5; 2 = 1
 rst best; - - - second best
Figure 6: Cconsumer surplus V as a function of accounting precision 1
2"
:
V. Conclusion
The e¤ect of risk on a rm is complex. As the shareholders and managers of a rm
have di¤erent incentives and degrees of risk-bearing ability, the operational decisions
made by the managers will be a¤ected by these di¤erences. We show that the presence
of agency problems leads to operating leverage and production output that are both
strictly lower than when the managers actions are observable or contractible. This
departure from optimal operational decisions results in lower rm prot, as well as
lower consumer surplus and total social welfare. However, an accounting system that
generates accounting information with high precision can help mitigate this problem.
While prior research has established the relationship between a rms operating
leverage and market price, no study has examined the impact of managerial incen-
tives on a rms operating leverage decision. Since the separation of ownership and
management is common in todays business world, the problem we demonstrate in
this paper is likely wide spread. Additionally, its potential consequences of reducing
shareholder value and consumer surplus may be a regulatory conern.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1:
Using backward induction, the rm owner rst maximizes her objective function
by choosing the managers personal investment I. Taking the rst order condition
with regard to I and setting it to zero, we have
IFB = 1:
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When choosing the production quantity Q, the manager maximizes the rm owners
objective function by taking the rst order condition with regard to Q and setting it
to zero. We thus have
(1) Q =
aK
2 + 2K
;
which is a function of the capital intensity K. Finally, in time 3, the manager max-
imizes the rm owners objective function by choosing an optimal level of capital
intensity K. Taking the rst order condition with regard to K and setting it to zero,
we have
K = Q:
Now solving for Q and K, we get
QFB =
a  2
2
;
and
KFB =
a  2
2
:
A Proof of Corollary 2:
The rms expected net prot  W , or the rm owners total expected payo¤,
is computed by substituting KFB, QFB, and IFB into the rm owners objective
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function. We get:
 W
= QFB(a QFB) KFB   Q
FB2
KFB
+ IFB   I
FB2
2
(A1)
=
1
4
 
a2   4a+ 6 :(A2)
The expected market-clearing price for the rms product is
P = a QFBa
=
a+ 2
2
:(A3)
The consumer surplus is thus
V =
Z Q
0
 
P (Q)  P FB dQ
=
1
2
Q2(A4)
=
1
8
(a  2)2(A5)
The total social welfare is the sum of producer prot and consumer surplus
 W + V
=
1
8
 
3a2   12a+ 16 :(A6)
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B Proof of Proposition 3:
The manager maximizes his utility by choosing his personal investment I: Taking
the rst order condition with regard to I we have
@
@I

 + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2

(B1)
=    I:
Setting it to equal zero, we get
I = :
Similarly, the manager maximizes his utility by choosing the production quantity Q:
Taking the rst order condition with regard to Q we have
@
@Q

 + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2

(B2)
=   1
K


2Q+ 2KQ Ka+KQ 
2

2
"
2 + 
2
"

:
Setting it to equal zero, we get
Q =
aK
2K +K
2
2
"
2+
2
"
+ 2
:
The manager maximizes his utility by choosing the capital intensity K: Taking the
rst order condition with regard to K we have
@
@K

 + 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2

(B3)
=
1
K2

 
Q2  K2 :
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Setting it to equal zero, we get
K = Q:
Solving for K and Q, we get
Q =
a  2
2 + 
2
2
"
2+
2
"
;
and
K =
a  2
2 + 
2
2
"
2+
2
"
:
Next we solve for the optimal contract terms  and . Since the managers
participation constraint is binding, we know
(B4)   = 

Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q22   I
2
2
:
Substituting equation B4, I; Q; and K into the rm owners problem, it becomes
max


Q(a Q) K   Q
2
K
+ I

  
2
2Q2
2
2
"
2 + 
2
"
  I
2
2
:
=
0B@ ( X2) 4 + (2X2   4X) 3 + (4Xa Xa2 + 4X   4) 2
+ (2Xa2   8Xa+ 8X + 8)  + (2a2   8a+ 8)
1CA
2 (X2 + 2)2
;(B5)
with X =  
2

2
"
2+
2
"
, for notational simplicity. Taking the rst order condition with
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regard to  and setting it to equal zero, we have
(B6)
0BBBB@
X44 + (2X3  X4 + 4X2) 3 + (12X   6X2) 2
+ (a2X3 + 2a2X   4aX3   8aX + 4X3 + 4X2   8X + 8) 
+ (2a2X2   2a2X   8aX2 + 8aX + 8X2   8X   8)
1CCCCA
  (X2 + 2)3 = 0:
Essentially,  is a root of this 4th degree polynomial. Per GaloisTheorem, we know
there are 4 roots to this problem. Let the above problem be rewritten into
(B7) 4 + A3 +B2 + C +D = 0;
with
A =
2X3  X4 + 4X2
X4
;
B =
12X   6X2
X4
;
C =
a2X3 + 2a2X   4aX3   8aX + 4X3 + 4X2   8X + 8
X4
;
D =
2a2X2   2a2X   8aX2 + 8aX + 8X2   8X   8
X4
:
Per GaloisTheorem, we know there are 4 roots to this problem. Evaluating the
four roots, only one satisfy the meaningful requirement of 0    1. Therefore we
get
 =
 A
4
+
1
2
s
A2
4
  2B
3
+
2
1
3 (B2   3AC + 12D)
3Z
1
3
+

Z
54
 1
3
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with
Z = 2B3   9ABC + 27C2 + 27A2D   72BD +q
 4 (B2   3AC + 12D)3 + (2B3   9ABC + 27C2 + 27A2D   72BD)2:
Substituting I; Q; K; and  into equation B4, we get :
C Proof of Corollary 4:
To evaluate the relation between Q and 1
2"
, we compute
@
@2"
0@ a  2
2 +  
2

2
"
2+
2
"
1A
=    2"2  a  2
(22" + 2
2
 + 
2
"
2

)2
< 0:
Thus we know Q decreases in 2", which is equivalent to Q
 increasing in 2". The
same can be shown for K.
Under the rst best scenario, the production quantity is QFB = a 2
2
. Under the
second best scenario, the production quantity is Q = a 2
2+
2

2"
2

+2"
: Since  
2

2
"
2+
2
"
> 0
by assumption, QFB > Q is true. The same can be shown with KFB > K.
D Proof of Corollary 5:
By denition,  W , the rms expected net prot (or the rm owners expected
payo¤), is lower under the second best scenario than under the rst best scenario.
The consumer surplus is V = 1
2
Q2: Since the production quantity under the rst
best scenario is higher than the production quantity under the second best scenario,
QFB > Q, we know V
 
QFB

> V (Q) : The total social welfare is the sum of the
23
rms expected net prot and the consumer surplus, and is obviously higher under
the rst best scenario than the second best scenario.
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